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Abstract. We analyze the FOO electronic voting protocol in the prov-
able security model using the technique of Computationally Complete
Symbolic Attacker (CCSA). The protocol uses commitments, blind sig-
natures and anonymous channels to achieve vote privacy. Unlike the
Dolev-Yao analyses of the protocol, we assume neither perfect cryp-
tography nor existence of perfectly anonymous channels. Our analysis
reveals new attacks on vote privacy, including an attack that arises due
to the inadequacy of the blindness property of blind signatures and not
due to a speciﬁc implementation of anonymous channels. With addi-
tional assumptions and modiﬁcations, we were able to show that the
protocol satisﬁes vote privacy in the sense that switching votes of two
honest voters is undetectable to the attacker. Our techniques demon-
strate eﬀectiveness of the CCSA technique for both attack detection and
veriﬁcation.
1 Introduction
The FOO protocol was introduced by Fujioka, Okamoto, and Ohta in [1]. It was
one of the ﬁrst protocols for large-scale secure electronic voting. The design was
supposed to achieve fairness, eligibility, vote privacy and individual veriﬁability.
Since it’s publication, it has been the subject of several attempts to formalize
and verify its security properties. The focus of this paper is the formal analysis of
vote privacy of FOO, namely, the property that the votes of honest voters cannot
be linked to the voters. There are more modern protocols nowadays such as [2,3].
We chose FOO because of its abstract formulation, which make it convenient for
symbolic analysis and its numerous phases which makes it prone to attacks.
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As far as we are aware of, the FOO protocol was the ﬁrst electronic voting
protocol that was formally speciﬁed and analyzed [4]. In the seminal work of
Kremer and Ryan [4], both the formalization and analysis of the FOO proto-
col was carried out in the Dolev-Yao (DY) attacker model using the applied
pi-framework [5]. The vote privacy property was the most intricate property
analyzed in [4], and Kremer and Ryan were only able to prove vote privacy by
hand. Subsequent development in DY veriﬁcation allowed the proof to carried
out automatically [6,7]. As the DY model makes the assumption of perfect cryp-
tography, the question of whether the proof carries over in the provable security
model (computational model) remained unanswered.
In this paper, we formally verify vote privacy in the provable security frame-
work, using symbolic veriﬁcation techniques. In particular, we use the computa-
tionally complete symbolic attacker technique for indistinguishability properties
introduced by Bana and Comon in [8] (a.k.a. CCSA framework). As far as we
know, this is the ﬁrst formal analysis of FOO protocol in the provable secu-
rity model. Besides proving vote privacy for FOO, our other aim is to further
develop the library of axioms of the CCSA framework and to demonstrate its
eﬀectiveness in attack detection and veriﬁcation.
CCSA technique was ﬁrst introduced by Bana and Comon in [9] for reach-
ability properties and then for indistinguishability properties in [8]. Since then
it has been used to ﬁnd new attacks to the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol
[10,11]; to treat algebraic operations notoriously diﬃcult to reason about in the
DY model, such as exponentiation along with it the decisional Diﬃe-Hellmann
property and versions of the Diﬃe-Hellman key-exchange protocol [12]; to ver-
ify unlinkability of RFID protocols [13]; and to analyze key wrapping API’s
[14]. Automated tool is not yet available for the indistinguishability technique,
but work is in progress. In the meantime, we continue developing the library of
axioms, and verifying relatively simple protocols by hand.
FOO protocol assumes two election authorities: administrator and collector.
The protocol proceeds in three phases: In the ﬁrst phase, voters prepare their
ballots in the form of a trapdoor commitment of their votes and obtain a blind
signature on the ballots from the administrator indicating that they are eligi-
ble to vote. In the second, voters send their ballots to the collector using an
anonymous channel who publishes them on a public bulletin board (BB). In the
ﬁnal phase, each voter veriﬁes the presence of their ballots on the BB and then
sends their trapdoor key along with the entry number of their commitment on
bulletin board to the collector, again via an anonymous channel. The trapdoor
keys are then also added to the bulletin board next to the commitments. After
the votes ﬁnish, votes are tallied from BB. The creators of the FOO protocol
did not specify how the anonymous channels are implemented. In our modeling,
we model anonymous channel as a mix-net server [15] which, upon receiving a
list of encrypted messages outputs their plaintexts in lexicographic order after
decrypting them.
FOO protocol is designed to provide vote privacy even when the adminis-
trator and collector are corrupt and our analysis of vote privacy assumes this
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to be the case. As in [4,16,17], vote privacy is modeled as indistinguishability
of two protocol executions: in one, honest voter A votes for candidate v1 and
honest voter B votes for candidate v2 and in the other, honest voter A votes
for candidate v2 and honest voter B votes for candidate v1. Observe that, as
stated above, FOO protocol does not satisfy vote privacy as the attacker may
choose to forward only Alice’s trapdoor key in the ﬁnal phase of the protocol to
the mix-net server. We argue that privacy of votes can never be guaranteed for
any voting protocol if the attacker allows only one participant to complete the
protocol. Hence, our formalization is carefully crafted to avoid these cases.
Our analysis revealed new attacks on the FOO protocol (See Sect. 3.2). The
ﬁrst attack occurs because of an inadequacy of blindness property of blind sig-
natures. Intuitively, blindness [18] means that a dishonest signer who engages
in two sessions (parallel or sequential) with an honest user on messages m0 and
m1 cannot detect which session is for m0 and which session is for m1 if the user
successfully outputs signatures in both sessions. The blindness property, how-
ever, does allow the possibility that the attacker can distinguish between the
sessions if the user is successful in only one session. In order to prevent this
attack, we have to assume that the identities of the candidates are of equal
length. This attack does not depend on the implementation of the anonymous
channel. The second attack exploits the fact that encryption scheme used by the
mix-net server may be length-revealing and hence the length of the encrypted
messages to the mix-net server may reveal their senders. In order to prevent
this, we have to assume that the signatures obtained on equal length messages
by executing the blind signature interactive protocol with the same signer must
be of equal length. The above two attacks lie outside the DY model and hence
were not detected in previous works on formal analysis of FOO protocol. A third
attack is a DY style replay attack in which messages from the Voting phase can
be replayed in the Opening phase. This attack can be prevented by introducing
phase numbers in the FOO protocol.
With these additional assumptions, we establish vote privacy of the FOO
protocol for one session with two honest voters and one dishonest voter. The
proof carries over to n dishonest voters for any ﬁxed n. The proof of vote privacy
rests on the blindness property of the blind signature, the computational hiding
property of the trapdoor commitments and of IND-CCA2 assumption on the
encryption used in the anonymizing mechanism. The proof of vote privacy in the
DY model, in contrast, relies only on the blindness property.1 The commitment
hiding property of trapdoor commitments does not play a role in establishing
vote privacy in the DY analysis.
Related Work. There have been several attempts at formal analysis of FOO
protocol in the DY model (see, for example, [4,6,7]). These analyses assume
perfectly anonymous channels. In the computational model, there are several
attempts at formalizing vote privacy in electronic voting such as in [16,17,19,20].
1 As evidence, we ran AKiSs [7] on a two-phase variant of the FOO protocol without
commitments. The variant satisﬁes the vote privacy property in the DY model.
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Please see [20] for a comparison amongst these deﬁnitions. All these deﬁnitions
apply to single phase voting protocols. Our deﬁnition is adapted to FOO-protocol
which has three phases. The only other work at formally verifying vote privacy
for electronic voting that we are aware of is the mechanized proof of vote privacy
for the Helios family of single-phase protocols given in [21]. The inadequacy of
the blindness axiom has also been pointed out in [22] who show how any blind
signature scheme can be combined with trapdoor commitments to resolve this
inadequacy.
2 FOO Voting Protocol and Its Computational Modeling
We brieﬂy recall the electronic voting protocol FOO introduced by Fujioka,
Okamoto, and Ohta in [1]. We assume that the reader is familiar with the crypto-
graphic primitives of public key encryption, trapdoor commitment schemes and
digital signatures schemes. The FOO protocol also uses blind signature schemes.
Informally, a blind signature scheme is an interactive protocol that allows a party
U to obtain the signature of a party S on a message that is obfuscated by U
until S completes the protocol and U publishes the signed message. We assume
as in [23,24] that the interactive protocol consists of three phases: blinding by
U , (blind) signing by S and unblinding by U . The primitives are described in
detail in Sect. 2.2.
The FOO protocol has three roles: voters (Vi), administrator (A), and collec-
tor (C). It assumes the existence of anonymous channels. Following Kremer et
al. [4], we group the (original) protocol in three phases, Authentication, Voting,
and Opening, as described in Fig. 1. In the Figure, → means send,  means
send via anonymous channel.
2.1 Anonymous Channel
The creators of FOO did not specify how to implement anonymous channels. We
model anonymous communication using a mix-net server which, upon receiving
a list of messages encrypted with its public key, checks if they are all distinct,
decrypts each message in the list, outputs them in lexicographic order. Hence-
forth, we refer to mix-net server as the mixer. In particular, in the Voting phase
(resp. Opening phase), the voter encrypts 〈ci, σA(ci)〉 (resp. 〈li, ki〉) with the
mixer M ’s public key pkM . The mixer waits until a certain time during which
receives the messages from the voters, checks if all messages received until that
time are distinct. If the check succeeds, the mixer decrypts the messages, shuﬄes
the decrypted messages into lexicographic order and outputs them.
2.2 Computational Modeling of the FOO Protocol
As usual, we assume that all agents in the protocol execution, the voters, the
administrator, the collector are interactive probabilistic polynomial-time Turing
(PPT) machines. Furthermore, the network is controlled by an attacker, which
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Fig. 1. FOO Voting Protocol
is also an interactive PPT machine. Each message goes through the attacker,
except those that are “published”, in which case the message is written directly
on each participant’s work tape synchronously. The Bulletin Board BB is simply
a list of tuples. We assume that the id’s IDi are the same as the voters’ public
keys used for verifying their digital signatures.
We assume that encryption used in the protocol is indistinguishable against
adaptive chosen cipher text attack, i.e., satisﬁes the IND-CCA2 property. The
interested reader is referred to [25]. Digital signatures are used in the protocol
to ensure that only eligible voters vote and do not play a part in establishing
vote privacy. We now present the computational modeling of the commitment
and blind digital signature schemes, and their security properties we assume for
the veriﬁcation.
Trapdoor Commitments. A trapdoor commitment scheme allows one party,
say V , to commit to a value obfuscating the value it committed to until it is
revealed by V with the help of the trapdoor. In general, a commitment scheme
satisﬁes two properties: binding and hiding. The former property states that the
party V cannot change the message once V committed to it while the latter
property says that it should be computationally infeasible for any other party to
retrieve the message from the commitment unless the V reveals the trapdoor.
Formally, a commitment scheme [25] C is a triple of algorithms (KG,
Commit, Open) such that KG is a PPT algorithm with input 1η, while Commit
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and Open are PT algorithms such that there is a polynomial p(·) such that for
each security parameter η and bit-string m of length at most p(η), Commit(m, k)
computes the commitment on message m for k ← KG(1η), and Open is a deter-
ministic algorithm such that for all k ← KG(1η), Open(Commit(m, k),m, k) =
true. We assume that the commitment schemes are length regular. That is, if
m0 and m1 are messages of equal length then the commitments of m0 and m1
are of equal length [26,27].
The computational hiding property is formalized as a game between a (PPT)
attacker and a (honest) challenger. Initially, the attacker generates two messages
m0 and m1 of equal length, which it gives to the challenger. The challenger creates
commitments, com0 and com1 for m0 and m1 with diﬀerent (secret) commitment
keys and sets a secret bit b with uniform probability. The challenger then gives
the ordered pair (comb, com1−b) to the attacker who wins if it correctly guesses
the value of b. The commitment scheme is said to satisfy the commitment hiding
property [25] if the winning probability of the attacker cannot be non-negligibly
diﬀerent from 12 .
Blind Digital Signatures. Blind signature schemes were introduced by
Chaum [23]. They are small interactive protocols between a user and a signer.
Informally, a blind signature scheme is an interactive protocol that allows a party
U to obtain the signature of a party S on a message that is obfuscated by U
until S completes the protocol and U publishes the signed message.
Formally, a blind digital signature scheme [18,24] B is a tuple
(Gen, 〈S,U〉 , verif), a PPT key generation algorithm Gen, an interactive algo-
rithm 〈S,U〉 of the PPT singer S and the PPT user U , and a PT veriﬁcation
algorithm verif, such that for each security parameter η: Gen(1η) outputs a public
and private key pair (pk, sk), the joint execution of signer S(pk, sk) and the user
U(pk,m) on the message m ∈ {0, 1}η produces an output σ for the user, and the
deterministic algorithm verif(m,σ, pk) outputs a bit. The algorithm U(pk,m)
may fail to produce an output; in which case U is said to abort and U(pk,m)
said to be undeﬁned. In that case, we write U(pk,m) = ⊥. A blind signature
scheme is required to be complete, i.e., for all parameter η the following holds:
for all messages m ∈ {0, 1}η, if (pk, sk) ← Gen(1η) then the joint execution of
S(pk, sk) and U(pk,m) must be deﬁned and the produced output σ should be
such that verif(m,σ, pk) = true.
Blind signatures should also satisfy two security properties, blindness and
unforgeability. Intuitively, unforgeability says a malicious user who engages in 
sessions with an honest user should not be able to produce  + 1 valid message-
signature pairs. In the FOO protocol, unforgeability is used to make sure only
eligible voters vote. It does not play a role in voting privacy. For this reason, we
omit the formalization of unforgeability. The interested reader is referred to [18].
The blindness property [18] on the other hand, is useful in establishing pri-
vacy of votes. Intuitively, blindness means that a dishonest signer cannot learn
the contents of the message it signed. The blindness property is formalized as a
game between a (PPT) attacker acting as the signer and a (honest) challenger.
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Initially, the attacker generates two messages m0 and m1, which it gives to the
challenger. The challenger sets a secret bit b with uniform probability. The chal-
lenger, acting as the user, then engages in two blind signature sessions with the
attacker as the signer; the ﬁrst is for obtaining signature on mb and the second
is for obtaining signature on m1−b. If the user successfully completes both ses-
sions and obtains signature σb, σ1−b then it gives the ordered pair (σ0, σ1) to the
attacker. Otherwise, it gives the pair (⊥,⊥) to the attacker. The attacker wins
if it correctly guesses the value of b. Note that it is important that the chal-
lenger gives the pair (σ0, σ1) and not (σb, σ1−b) (otherwise the attacker will win
with probability 1). The blind signature scheme is said to satisfy the blindness
property [18] if the winning probability of the attacker cannot be non-negligibly
diﬀerent from 12 .
We model the blind signatures using an interactive protocol between the user
and the singer in three steps, blinding, blind signing, and unblinding and involv-
ing four algorithms, blind, bsign, accept, and unblind [23,24]. Before the protocol
commences, the signer generates a public key and secret-key pair (pk, sk) and
publishes pk. Blinding: User computes b := blind(m, pk, rb) for a message m,
using the signer’s public key pk, and a random seed rb, and sends b to the
signer. Blind signing: The signer computes ρ := bsign(b, sk, rs) using his own
secret key sk and a random seed rs, and sends it to the user. Unblinding: User
checks validity of ρ by running accept(m, pk, rb, ρ). If it outputs false, the user
quits the protocol without any output. If it outputs true, the user computes
σ = unblind(m, pk, rb, ρ).
3 Vote Privacy for the FOO Protocol
The fundamental idea of vote privacy in the literature is that permutation of
votes cast by honest voters cannot be detected by the attacker. There are numer-
ous attempts to formalize this idea such as [19,20]. In the FOO protocol however,
unlike the single-phase protocols considered therein, the Bulletin Board (BB) is
built incrementally in diﬀerent phases. Hence, we have to adapt the deﬁnition
of privacy of votes to FOO protocol. We describe our formalization below. We
consider only one session.
3.1 Formalization of Vote Privacy
We assume that the attacker controls the network and we allow the administrator
and the collector to be corrupt. We require that the ﬂipping of votes of two
honest voters should result in computationally indistinguishable runs to any PPT
attacker even if he controls all other voters. Under these assumptions however,
there is an obvious unavoidable attack. Suppose A votes v0 and B votes v1, while
in the ﬂipped voting scenario, A votes v1 and B votes v0. If the attacker allows the
ballots of both A and B to be posted in the Voting phase, but subsequently blocks
B’s message in the opening phase, then the two situations will be distinguishable.
This is because in the ﬁrst scenario only v0 vote will appear on the BB, while
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in the second, only v1. Therefore, our formalization requires that the scenario
with the original votes and with the ﬂipped votes be indistinguishable only when
either both voters’ votes appear on the BB or neither does.
Accordingly, we require the following two games to be computationally indis-
tinguishable to a PPT attacker. For bit b, let Πb be the following game between
the Attacker and the Challenger simulating two honest voters of the FOO proto-
col and the mixer but aborting when only one of the commitment keys reach the
mixer. The attacker simulates the corrupt administrator, the corrupt collector,
and at the end has to guess the value of b:
1. Challenger publishes public keys of A, B, and the mixer, and a list of can-
didates.
2. Attacker publishes possibly dishonestly generated public keys of other vot-
ers, the administrator, and the collector. It then gives Challenger two valid
votes v0 and v1.
3. Challenger creates the ballots of vb for A and v1−b for B.
4. Attacker calls one of A or B to authorize vote with administrator.
5. Challenger prepares the corresponding blinded ballot. It sends the corre-
sponding identity, the blinded ballot, and the corresponding signature to
the attacker.
6. Attacker creates the possibly fake authorization, sends it back to the voter,
and calls for the other voter to carry out the authorization.
7. Challenger prepares the appropriate blinded ballot and sends it to the
attacker.
8. Attacker creates and sends again the authorization now for the other voter,
and asks either A or B to proceed with sending the ballot.
9. If the corresponding blind signature was accepted, Challenger unblinds it,
and sends the signed ballot encrypted with the mixer’s public key. Otherwise
skips.
10. Attacker makes some computations and sends a message back (which is
possibly the unchanged ciphertext sent in the previous step).
11. If the other of A or B’s blind signature was accepted, Challenger now
unblinds that, sends the signed ballot encrypted with the mixer’s public
key. Otherwise skips.
12. Attacker makes some computations and sends a message back (which is
possibly the unchanged ciphertext sent in the previous step).
13. Attacker also sends the Challenger further possible encrypted signed ballots
of the other, possibly corrupted voters.
14. Challenger waits for all the signed encrypted ballots to arrive. It decrypts
the signed ballots with the secret key of the mixer, and puts them through
the shuﬄe. Gives the result of the shuﬄe to the attacker.
15. Attacker creates the bulletin board BB and gives it to the Challenger. Note
that the ballots of A and B may or may not appear on the BB. Attacker
also speciﬁes which of A or B should move to the next step ﬁrst.
16. If A (resp. B) was asked to move next, A (resp. B) accepted the blind
signature in phase 2 and A’s (resp. B’s) ballot appears on the bulletin board,
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then the Challenger sends A’s (resp. B’s) 〈li, ki〉 to the attacker encrypted
with the public key of the mixer. Otherwise, the challenger skips this step.
17. Attacker makes some computations and sends a message back (which is
possibly the unchanged cipher sent in the previous step).
18. If the other agent accepted the blind signature in phase 2 and its ballot
appeared on the bulletin board, then the Challenger sends the other agent’s
〈li, ki〉 to the attacker encrypted with the public key of the mixer. Otherwise,
it skips this step.
19. Attacker makes some computations and sends a message back (which is
possibly the unchanged cipher sent in the previous step).
20. Attacker may also send other messages of the form 〈li, ki〉 encrypted.
21. Challenger puts the decrypted messages through the shuﬄe. If only one of
A’s or B’s commitment key appears, the Challenger aborts. If none of them
appear or both of them appear, the Challenger gives the result of the shuﬄe
to the attacker.
22. The attacker outputs 0 or 1.
If in the situation above the probability that the attacker outputs 1 playing
game Π0 is non-negligibly diﬀerent from outputting 1 playing game Π1, then
the attacker wins the game. Our aim is to show that no PPT attacker can win
the above game.
3.2 Attacks on the FOO Protocol
We describe three attacks on the vote privacy for FOO protocol, which we caught
with the CCSA technique. We will comment at the beginning of Sect. 4 on how
attacks are found in CCSA, and then in Sect. 5.3 on how these speciﬁc attacks
were found. The ﬁrst two attacks cannot be captured in the DY model as they
cannot be discovered under the assumption of perfect cryptography. Moreover,
the ﬁrst attack is an issue of the original FOO protocol and the standard deﬁni-
tion of blindness property; it is not a feature of our implementation of anonymous
channels. On the other hand, the second attack appears because our implemen-
tation uses CCA secure encryption. The third attack is DY in nature but does
not appear in previous DY analyses of the protocol as those analyses assume
perfectly anonymous channels.
The ﬁrst attack exploits an insuﬃciency in the blindness property. This insuf-
ﬁciency has also been pointed out in [22]. Recall that in the blindness game, a
(potentially dishonest) signer engages in two sessions (parallel or sequential) with
an honest user on messages m0 and m1. If one session successfully completes and
the other aborts then the information of which session aborted is not revealed
to the attacker. Thus, the blindness property does not rule out the possibility
that the signer is able to deduce which session corresponded to m0 and which
corresponded to m1 if one session aborted and the signer knows which session
aborted. For example, in the three-step blind signature scheme described above,
replace accept by accept′ where accept′(m, pk, rb, ρ) always returns false if m is of
even length and returns the value of accept(m, pk, rb, ρ) otherwise. The resulting
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blind signature scheme continues to satisfy the blindness property if the original
one does. Now, if m0 is of even length and m1 is of odd length, then the session
corresponding to message m0 always aborts and thus the dishonest signer be
able to associate the aborted session to m0.
The ﬁrst attack on FOO protocol proceeds as follows. Assume that we use
the modiﬁed blind signature scheme in the FOO protocol and that the candidate
choice v0 is of even length and the choice v1 is of odd length. Since commitments
may reveal the length, it is possible that the commitment of v0 is also even while
of v1 is odd. Assume that A chooses vb and Bob chooses v1−b. Vote privacy
requires that the attacker not be able to deduce the value of b. In authentication
phase, the attacker, acting as the administrator, correctly follows the protocol.
The blinding still hides the commitments even though their lengths are diﬀerent,
but according to our modiﬁed accept algorithm, the signature on v0 will be
rejected while the one on v1 will be accepted. Then during the voting phase,
only one voter will send its ballot to the administrator. If this voter is A then
b must be 1, otherwise b must be 0. Note, this attack is not a feature of our
speciﬁc implementation of the anonymous channel. Note also that even though
the commitments are revealed on the BB, there they appear in the same order
on the two sides, so the attack works not because the commitments reveal to the
attacker the vote inside, but because one accept may pass, the other may not.
Observe also that the attack does not manifest if v0 and v1 are of equal length.
Indeed, if v0 and v1 are of equal length then the property of commitment hiding
ensures that an abort by a voter does not reveal information about its intended
vote.
The second attack relies on the fact that there is no guarantee on the lengths
of the (blind) signatures and that an encryption scheme used may reveal the
lengths of the underlying plaintexts. If a length revealing encryption scheme
(such as IND-CCA2) is used then the encrypted ballots in the voting phase
are diﬀerent, which allows the attacker to deduce how A and B voted. To rule
out this attack, we have to assume that the (blind) signatures on equal length
messages are of equal length.
Finally, we point out the DY style attack. The attack replays a message in
the voting phase of the protocol in the opening phase. Assume that there is a
third voter C in addition to A and B. The attacker remembers A’s encrypted
ballot to the mixer in the voting phase. In the opening phase of the protocol,
the attacker forwards the encrypted commitment keys of A and B to the mixer,
but replaces C’s commitment key by A’s encrypted ballot from the voting phase.
The mixer checks that the three encryptions are diﬀerent, decrypts them and
outputs them after shuﬄing them into lexicographic order. The only ballot that
appears in the output is A’s. The commitment keys of A and B are also part
of the output. The attacker can then deduce how A and B voted. In order to
prevent this attack, we modify the FOO protocol to also include phase numbers
inside the encryptions in the voting and opening phases of the FOO protocol.
The mixer must check that the phase numbers correspond to the current phase
in the protocol.
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4 Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker (CCSA)
The CCSA model was introduced by Bana and Comon in [9] with the aim of
establishing computational guarantees for symbolic analysis by making the sym-
bolic attacker as powerful as the computational one. We limit our attention
in this paper to their indistinguishability framework given in [8]. The CCSA
framework is similar to the DY framework in the sense that explicit symbolic
adversarial messages are created. The DY framework speciﬁes all rules that the
attacker can use to create new messages from what he has seen, and the protocol
agents use pattern matching to check whether messages coming from the attacker
have the correct form. On the other hand, in the CCSA framework, each message
from the attacker is modeled by a function fi applied to the sequence of messages
that the attacker has seen thus far. Pattern matching is replaced by applying
function symbols on the term coming from the attacker. Limitations on attacker
capabilities originating from computational assumptions on the primitives are
speciﬁed as a set of axioms A in ﬁrst-order logic based on a single indistinguisha-
bility predicate (representing computational indistinguishability of sequences of
messages). Computationally, a security property of a protocol Π is formulated as
the computational indistinguishability of two protocols Π1 and Π2 constructed
(depending on the security property) from the original Π.
Verification. In the CCSA framework, the security translates to the validity
of the formula obtained by applying the indistinguishability predicate on the
list of terms produced by the symbolic execution of Π1 and Π2. Hence the
security formula obtained this way must be derived as a logical consequence of
the axioms A using ﬁrst-order inference. If the formula is derived and the axioms
in A shown to be computationally sound then the protocol Π is computationally
secure according to Theorem 1 in [8].
Attack finding. If the security formula cannot be derived then the negation of
the security formula is consistent with A and a symbolic attacker model is then
obtained. In practice, for the security proof, a proof tree is being built, and some
branch cannot be reduced to axioms. For example, often what happens is that it
cannot be shown that an attacker message fi(· · · ) cannot equal a term, that is,
the attacker may produce a message that passes some check when it should not.
Then from this branch, an Herbrand model can be built on the terms, resulting
in a symbolic attack. This symbolic attack then has to be checked to see if it
corresponds to a computational attacker or if it originates from having too few
axioms in A, as the set of axioms is not complete.
4.1 Syntax
Terms: Let S be a ﬁnite set of sorts that includes at least the sorts bool and
msg. X is an inﬁnite set of variable symbols, each coming with a sort s ∈ S.
Terms are built on a set of function symbols F representing honest computation
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of primitives, a set of function symbols G representing attacker’s computation, a
set of zero-arity function symbols (names) N representing honest generation of
randomness, and a set of variables X . The set F contains the basic symbols such
as 0, true , false , L, 〈 , 〉, EQ( , ), if then else , π1 and π2 with the typing
rules as follows:
– 0 : msg representing the empty message.
– true , false : bool.
– L( ) : msg → msg. L(x) represents the length of x in unary.
– 〈 , 〉 : msg × msg → msg representing pairs.
– Polymorphic equality test EQ( , ) :
msg × msg → bool
bool × bool → bool.
– Polymorphic conditional branching if then else : bool × msg × msg → msg
bool × bool × bool → bool.
– π1( ), π2( ) : msg → msg. πi represents the i-th projection of a pair
Formulas: As presented in [12], we have for every sequence of sorts s1, . . . , sn
a predicate symbol that takes 2 × n arguments of sort (s1 × . . . × sn)2, which we
write as t1, . . . , tn ∼ u1, . . . , un. The predicate t1, . . . , tn ∼ u1, . . . , un represents
computational indistinguishability of the two sequences of terms t1, . . . , tn and
u1, . . . , un.
The ﬁrst-order formulas are built from the above atomic formulas combining
the Boolean connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, and →, and the quantiﬁers ∀ and ∃. The formu-
las are used to represent both axioms (assumptions) and the security properties
of the protocols.
Equational Theory: We use binary relation symbol =E to indicate equations
the function symbols have to satisfy. Note that =E is not part of the ﬁrst-
order signature. The equations speciﬁed by =E will result in axioms for ∼.
We assume that the following hold: ∀x1, x2. πi(〈x1, x2〉) =E xi, for i = 1, 2;
L(L(x)) =E L(x).
Abbreviations: In order to reduce the size of the terms, we shall use the
following abbreviations: not(b)
def≡ if b then false else true , b1 & b2 def≡
if b1 then b2 else false , b1 or b2
def≡ if b1 then true else b2 and x = y def≡ EQ(x, y) ∼
true . The abbreviation EQL(x1, x2)
def≡ EQ(L(x1), (L(x2))) modeling length
equality test. Finally, the abbreviation 〈x1, x2, x3〉 def≡ 〈x1, 〈x2, x3〉〉 encodes
triples.
4.2 Semantics
As Bana and Comon deﬁned it in [8], the logic is interpreted over a computational
model. A computational model Mc is a particular ﬁrst-order model in which the
domain consists of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms taking the input 1η
362 G. Bana et al.
together with two inﬁnitely long random tapes (ρ1, ρ2), where ρ1 is for honestly
generated names, and ρ2 for adversarial use. We use [[ ]] to denote the semantics
of syntactic objects. Once [[ ]] is given on function symbols, and a valuation
σ of variables of term t in the domain, the interpretation of t in the domain
is deﬁned the usual way and denoted as [[t]]σ. Let [[t]]ση,ρ := [[t]]
σ(1η; ρ1, ρ2). In
this model, function symbols in F representing the cryptographic primitives
are interpreted as polynomial-time algorithms and they act on the outputs of
the PPT algorithms in their arguments. For example, [[EQ(t1, t2)]]ση,ρ := 1 if
[[t1]]ση,ρ = [[t2]]
σ











η,ρ = 0. Function symbols in G
representing adversarial computation are interpreted as probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms and they also act on the outputs of the PPT algorithms in
their arguments, but they can also use randomness from ρ2. Each name n ∈ N
is interpreted as a machine [[n]] which extracts a random word of length p(η)
(where p is a polynomial globally ﬁxed by Mc) from ρ1. Diﬀerent names draw
from disjoint parts of the tape ρ1. The predicate symbol ∼ is interpreted as
computational indistinguishability of the outputs of the PPT algorithms on the
two sides of ∼. Interested reader can consult either [8] or [12] for complete
deﬁnition of this semantics. A formula is computationally valid if it is satisﬁed
in all computational interpretations.
4.3 Computationally Valid Axioms
A core set of valid axioms of the CCSA have been given in [12]. Essentially, these
core axioms can be divided into four sets. The ﬁrst set of axioms reﬂect the prop-
erties of the indistinguishability predicate ∼, namely, that it is an equivalence
relation and is preserved under projection, permutation and function applica-
tion. The second set of axioms says that the abbreviation = is a congruence and
preserves the equational theory =E . The third set of axioms reﬂect the proper-
ties of the function symbol if then else such as if true thenx else y = x. Finally,
we have a couple of axioms that reﬂect the truly random nature of names such
as replacing any name n1 by a fresh name n2 yields indistinguishable sequence
of terms. The interested reader is referred to [12] for additional details, where
several small examples of usage of the axioms are also given.
5 Vote Privacy for the FOO Protocol in CCSA
Framework
We assume that the FOO protocol is modiﬁed to ensure that the length candidate
identities are equal and that the phase identiﬁers are used in Voting and Opening
phases. We will drop the adjective modiﬁed in the rest of the section and show
how vote privacy can be modeled in CCSA framework. In order to make things
simpler, we assume that other than voters A and B, there is only a single other
(possibly dishonest) voter. The proof of vote privacy carries over to n dishonest
voters for any ﬁxed n.
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5.1 Function Symbols and Axioms
In order to formalize the FOO voting protocol in the CCSA framework, we
shall include the following (see Table 1) function symbols in F . Please note that
each argument in these symbols has sort msg. Each key-generation algorithm
and each random seed generation will be represented by a corresponding unary
function symbol. When the function symbol is applied to a name n (recall that
names represent truly random objects), then the resulting term shall represent
a correctly generated key or seed.
Table 1. FOO function symbols with their co-domain sorts (each argument sort is
msg)
Commitments. We include a symbol kc( ) in F to represent the key gen-
eration algorithm for the commitment schemes deﬁned in Sect. 2.2. com(x, y)
is the commitment of x using the key y whereas open(u, z) is the open-
ing of the commitment u using the key z. We assume that, for all x, y,
open(com(x, kc(y)), kc(y)) =E x.
Encryptions. The symbol ke( ) denotes the public-key secret-key pair gener-
ation algorithm of encryptions. We deﬁne pke(x)
def≡ π1(ke(x)) and ske(x) def≡
π2(ke(x)), the public encryption key and secret decryption key parts of ke(x)
respectively. In order to formalize the random seed of encryptions, we introduce
a symbol re( ) (see Table 1). Encryption of x with random seed z and public
key y is denoted as {x}zy and decryption of x with secret key z is denoted as
dec(x, z). We assume that for all x, y, z, dec({x}zpke(y), ske(y)) =E x.
Blind Signatures. We introduce a symbol kb( ) to represent a public-
veriﬁcation-key secret-signing-key pair generation algorithm of blind signatures.
Once again, pkb(x)
def≡ π1(kb(x)) and skb(x) def≡ π2(kb(x)) represent the public
veriﬁcation key and secret signing key parts of the key kb(x). We also introduce a
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symbol rb( ) to represent blinding key generation algorithm. The interpretations
of the function symbols b, bsign, bver, ub and acc are blind, blindsign, verify,
unblind and accept as deﬁned in Sect. 2.2. b(x, y, z) is the blinding of the mes-
sage x using the public veriﬁcation key y and the blinding key z. bsign(x, y, r)
is the (blinded) message x blind-signed with secret blind signing key y and ran-
dom seed r. acc(x, y, z, w) is the acceptance check of the blindsign w created
for the blinded message b(x, y, z) and ub(x, y, z, w) its unblinding. ⊥ represents
undeﬁned that is used to model blindness game. Finally, bver(x, s, y) is the ver-
iﬁcation of unblinded signature s on the message x with the public veriﬁcation
key y. The co-domains of the symbol acc and bver are bool.
Digital Signatures. In addition to blind signatures, we also need plain digital
signatures. As in [12], let ks( ) represent generation of a key pair, the public
veriﬁcation key and the secret signing key. vk(x)
def≡ π1(ks(x)) and ssk(x) def≡
π2(ks(x)) represent the public veriﬁcation key and secret signing key parts of
the key ks(x). In order to randomize signatures, we introduce a symbol rs( ) for
random seed generation. sign(x, y, r) is the message x singed with secret signing
key y with a random seed r and ver(z, u, y) is the veriﬁcation of signature u on
the message z with the public veriﬁcation key y.
Mixer. We introduce a symbol shufl( , , ) to model the shuﬄing functionality
of mix-nets. shufl(x1, x2, x3) is the lexicographic ordering of the messages x1, x2,
and x3. As we model only three voters, shufl has only three arguments.
Other Function Symbols. We introduce constants ph2 (resp. ph3) to repre-
sent the Voting (resp. Opening) Phase of the FOO protocol. These symbols are
necessary to avoid replay attacks in which an attacker can learn honest vote
value by forwarding one of the honest voter’s message from the Voting Phase to
the Opening Phase (see Subsect. 3.2). Constants A and B model the identity of
two honest voters and constant M models the identity of the mixer. C1, C2, C3
model the identities of the candidates. (For simplicity, we assume only three
candidates.) Finally, the function symbols to( ),V0( ),V1( ), pubkey( ) are used
to model the security game and explained in Sect. 5.2.
Axioms. We present axioms (see Table 2) that formalize the security assump-
tions on the primitives. The axioms use the notion of freshness [8]: For any list
of names n, and a (possibly empty) list of terms v, fresh(n;v) is the constraint
that the names in n are pairwise distinct and that none of the names in n occur
in v.
The axiom CompHid models the computational hiding property of the com-
mitments (see Sect. 2.2). Intuitively, the axiom says that if the attacker is pre-
sented with commitments on equal length messages but the order of these mes-
sages is hidden, then the attacker cannot determine the order if it does not have
access to commitment keys. CompHid can be shown to be computationally valid
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if and only if [[kc( )]], [[com( , )]], [[open( , )]] satisfy the computational hiding
property.
The axiom Blindness models the blindness property of the blind signatures
(see Sect. 2.2). Intuitively, in the blindness game, the dishonest signer attacker is
asked to sign two blinded messages (could be of unequal length), but the order
of these messages is hidden. Thus, the blinded messages on the two sides of ∼
are in reversed order. Moreover, the signer is also allowed to see the unblinded
signatures if the user does not abort for either signature. However, in order
to hide the order, the unblinded signatures are presented in the same order.
Blindness can be shown to be computationally valid if and only if blind sig-
nature scheme ([[kb]].[[rb]], [[b]], [[ub]], [[bsign]], [[acc]], [[bver]]) satisﬁes the blindness
property. The axiom Shuffle models the shuﬄing capability of the mixer. We
also require further assumptions on the primitives. In particular, CommEQL mod-
els the assumption that the length of commitments on equal length messages are
equal. CommKeyEQL models the assumption that the length of honestly generated
commitment keys are equal. UBNotUndefined models the assumption that if a
user successfully completes the blind signature protocol then then the output is
diﬀerent from ⊥. UBEQL models the assumption that blind signatures on equal
length message are of equal length. PairEQL models the length regularity of pair-
ing. CandEQL (resp. PhaseEQL) models the assumptions that candidate identities
(resp. phase identities) are of equal length. AgentDist (resp. PhaseDist) mod-
els the assumption that identities of honest voters (resp. phase identiﬁers) are
distinct.
Finally, we recall the axiom representing IND-CCA2 property of encryptions
from [12]. Let t [x] be a list of terms with a single variable x. For a closed term
v, let t [v] denote the term that we receive from t [x] by replacing all occurrences
of x by v. Let u, u′, u′′ be closed terms. Consider the formula




in which n1 ∈ N occurs only as k(n1), sk(n1) only occurs in decryption position
(that is, as in dec( , sk(n1))), and n2, n3 do not occur anywhere else. We call the
above formula EncCCA2 if for any t′[x] term with x explicitly occurring in t′[x],
dec(t′[x], sk(n1)) occurs only as, if EQ(t′[x], x) then t′′[x] else dec(t′[x], sk(n1)),
where t′′[x] is not of the form dec(t′′′[x], sk(n1)). The intuition is that since
in the IND-CCA2 game, after encryption, the decryption oracle decrypts only
those messages that are diﬀerent from the encryption, we have to make sure that
the decrypted message, t′[x] is diﬀerent from the encryption, for which x stands.
The reader is referred to [12] for additional details.
5.2 Modeling the Vote Privacy Security Game
As deﬁned in [8], the BC technique treats protocols as abstract transition sys-
tems. We do not recall the formal deﬁnitions, we just apply them to the vote
privacy games Πb for b = 0, 1 between the Challenger and the Attacker as
deﬁned in Sect. 3.1. The transition system produces the terms of the execution,
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Table 2. Axioms that formalize the computational assumptions of the primitives
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Fig. 2. Authentication phase of the security game Πb
on which the indistinguishability predicate is applied. The veriﬁcation task is to
prove that the axioms together with ﬁrst-order inference rules imply that the
execution terms produced by the transition system for b = 0 and for b = 1 are
indistinguishable.
Recall that in addition to honest voters A and B, there is an additional
voter only a single other voter. We assume the mixer M is honest, and the
administrator as well as the collector are corrupt. Recall that we assume that
the names A, B, and M are distinct message constants. We also use distinct
names nA, nB , nM for (honest) signing key generations for the voters A, B, and
encryption key generation for the Mixer M .
The function symbol to extracts from an incoming message the agent name.
This allows the attacker to specify which of A, B, and M should receive the
message sent by the attacker. The function symbols Vb, b ∈ {0, 1} extract from
an incoming attacker message the candidate choices for the honest voters A and
B. The function symbol pubkey extracts from an incoming attacker message the
(dishonest) public-key of the attacker.
We present the transition diagram that represents the Authentication Phase
of the security game Πb in Fig. 2. It illustrates all possible moves of the challenger
in the authentication phase. At the start of the game, the knowledge of the
attacker is initialized and is represented by φ0. The left branch of q1000 represents
the situation where A moves ﬁrst for authentication followed by B while the
right branch simulates the situation that B moves ﬁrst followed by A. θpi [xj ]s
are the bool conditions that the challenger checks upon receiving the message xj
from the attacker before taking the respective transitions. Here p represents the
Phase number, i represents the agent that has to move (we use 1 for A, 2 for B
and 3 for M) and j represents the message number. Similarly the terms tpi [xj ]s
represent the outputs of the challenger to the attacker which increases attacker’s
knowledge. When the checks in a transition fail, the transition moves to state
qexit, which we omit in transition diagram for clarity. The transition systems for
other phases can be similarly deﬁned (see full version of the paper [28]).
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We obtain the execution terms from the transition system in the following
way. For a given b bit of the Challenger, Φbi lists of terms representing what the
attacker has seen up to step i are created according to the rounds of the protocol.
Notice that the initialization frame Φ0 is deﬁned in Fig. 2 and it is independent
of the bit b. For the ﬁrst step, the attacker’s computation f1 is applied to Φ0,













and we set Φb1


















1)] else0 ) else0 ),
and Φb2
def≡ Φb1, φb2, which is the end of the authentication phase. The other phases
are done similarly continuing from Φb3.
Let Φbm be the last frame. In order to establish vote-privacy for the FOO
protocol we have to show that the axioms and ﬁrst-order inference rules imply
that Φ0m ∼ Φ1m. Then from the soundness theorem of [8], it follows that there is
no successful PPT attacker that breaks the security game. We have the following.
Theorem 1. The modified FOO protocol respects vote privacy for one session
with two honest voters and one dishonest voter.
Proof Sketch: We recall the core axioms FuncApp and IfBranch from [12]:
FuncApp : f ∈ F ∪ G, x ∼ y −→ x, f(x) ∼ y, f(y).
IfBranch : z, b, x1, ..., xn ∼ z′, b′, x′1, ..., x′n ∧ z, b, y1, ..., yn ∼ z′, b′, y′1, ..., y′n
−→
z, b,
if b then x1
else y1
, ...,
if b then xn
else yn




if b′ then x′n
else y′n
.
Instead of showing the full security proof, we show how the combination of
CompHid, CommEQL, UBNotUndefined and Blindness allows us to ﬁx the inad-
equacy of the blindness property. The key idea is that as the length of can-
didate identities are equal, the commitments hide the underlying vote. Thus,
the probability that the attacker can cause the blind signature for candidate vb
is accepted but rejected for v1−b is negligibly small. This is formalized in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Let v0, v1, t be ground terms, let z be a list of ground
terms. Assume EQL(v0, v1) = true . Let t0 and t1 be terms contain-
ing two variables x and y. Let nb0, nb1, nc0, nc1 be names such that
fresh(nb0, nb1, nc0, nc1;z, t, v0, v1, t0, t1) holds. Suppose that the blind signatures
satisfy Blindness and UBNotUndefined, and commitments satisfy CompHid and
CommEQL properties. Then
z, b(c00[v0], t, rb(nb0)), b(c
0
1[v1], t, rb(nb1)), t
0 ∼ z, b(c10[v1], t, rb(nb0)), b(c11[v0], t, rb(nb1)), t1
(1)
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else if acc01 then
〈⊥, 〈ub01[v1], c01[v1], kc(nc1)
〉〉
else 〈⊥,⊥〉



















else if acc10 then
〈⊥, 〈ub10[v1], c10[v1], kc(nc0)
〉〉
else 〈⊥,⊥〉
tji = ti[x ← b(cj0[vj ], t, rb(b0))), y ← b(cj1[v1−j ], t, rb(b1)))], i, j ∈ {0, 1},
c0i [vi] ≡ com(vi, kc(nci)) c1i [v1−i] ≡ com(v1−i, kc(nci))
acc0i ≡ acc(c0i [vi], t, rb(nbi), t0i ) acc1i ≡ acc(c1i [v1−i], t, rb(nbi), t1i )
ub0i [vi] ≡ ub(c0i [vi], t, rb(nbi), t0i ) ub1i [v1−i] ≡ ub(c1i [v1−i], t, rb(nbi), t1i )








and bji [vj⊕i] ≡ b(cji [vj⊕i], t, rb(nbi))







































∼ z, b10[v1], b11[v0], acc10 & acc11, if acc11−i thenu11−i[vi] else⊥
which follow from CompHid and FuncApp. However, the axiom itself is not suf-
ﬁcient, we need the condition that the votes have equal length, otherwise these
cannot be proven and an attack is constructed, which is the ﬁrst attack described
in Sect. 3.2.
Of course, in the actual security game, encryptions are sent too where the
votes are also in reversed order, and decryptions are done by the mixer. This is
dealt with the EncCCA2 axiom. For the applicability of the axiom, the terms sent
have to be rewritten using the equality to introduce cases when the adversarial
function symbols on which decryptions are applied are either of the previous
encryptions (namely the ones sent by voter A and B), or when they are neither.
More precisely, a term of the form dec(f(Φ), sk(n1)), assuming that Φ has say
two honest encryptions in them, {t}r(n)pk(n1) and {t′}
r(n′)
pk(n1)




else if EQ(f(Φ), {t′}r(n′)pk(n1)) then t
′ else dec(f(Φ), sk(n1))
.
Thus, when the attacker messages are equal to some encrypted messages sent,
the decryptions can be replaced by the plaintext. When they are not equal, then
the decryption on the function symbol is kept. Once this is done, the EncCCA2
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axiom can be applied, and the plaintexts inside the encryptions can now be
switched as long as they are of equal length. This is why we needed to assume
that the unblinding results equal length. Without that assumption we obtain
the second attack in Sect. 3.2.
Finally, when the decryptions are applied on the correct previous encryp-
tions, there are still several possibilities for each decryption because a priori the
adversary could redirect the same encryption twice. A priori, each decryption
will succeed on any of the previous (four) encryptions sent by A and B. To ensure
that there is no clash, we made sure that the mixer checks both the phase and
that all the decryptions are diﬀerent. Otherwise we obtain the third attack of
Sect. 3.2. unionsq
5.3 Attack Finding
Finally we comment on how we found the attacks presented in Sect. 3.2, which
was actually rather simple for this protocol. We illustrate this on the ﬁrst two
attacks. Suppose that we do not require that the lengths of the names of the
candidates are the same. At a certain point we arrive at having to verify that the
messages sent by the challenger up to point 9 in Sect. 3.1 are equivalent in the
two executions with ﬂipped votes. This is the point when one of A or B according
to the attacker’s choice is supposed to have sent her ballot after having accepted
the blind signature. As all the messages in the frames, this on both sides has
the form of if c then t1 else t2 , where c has all the conditions to get to this point,
t2 = 0, and t1 has the encrypted ballot of either A or B depending on which
of them was called ﬁrst by the adversary, which in turn contains corresponding
unﬂipped vote on one side and the ﬂipped vote on the other side. To show
that the two sides are equivalent, we would need to use the IND-CCA2 axiom
for encryption, but that is only applicable if the equality of the lengths of the
plaintexts are veriﬁed. However, without the formula L(v1) = L(v2) this cannot
be derived, and this gives our second attack through an Herbrand model. The
ﬁrst attack is obtained when we try to verify that the condition c on the two
sides are equivalent. This condition contains the acc function symbol applied
on the blind signature of v1 or v2, ﬂipped on the two sides. The only axiom
that is suitable to verify such diﬀerence (in the absence of encryption in c) the
hiding of the commitment. Note, the blindness axiom can only be applied once
both blind signatures were accepted, but at this point we only have one on each
branch. The hiding of the commitment on the other hand can only be applied if
the lengths are equal. As a result, we can set again L(v1) = L(v2) and one of the
accepts to true and the other to false , and again an Herbrand model delivers
a symbolic attack, which turns out to be a real computational one.
6 Conclusions
We analyzed the FOO electronic voting protocol for vote privacy in the provable
security model using the computationally complete symbolic attacker (CCSA)
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framework. As part of the analysis, we showed that security properties of trap-
door commitments and blind signatures can be faithfully translated into axioms
in the CCSA framework. We demonstrated that the framework is eﬀective in
that it revealed new attacks on the FOO protocol and could be used to prove
the modiﬁed FOO protocol secure. As part of future work, we plan to investi-
gate expressing and verifying stronger privacy properties of receipt-freeness and
coercion-resistance for electronic voting protocols in the CCSA framework. We
also plan to investigate automation of the veriﬁcation tasks.
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